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A B S T R A C T
The present study examines the adoption of high-performance work practices (HPWPs) in family versus
non-family ﬁrms, and evaluates the effect of such practices on the retention of valuable employees in
light of different family contingencies. The analysis is carried out on a sample of 232 companies with
more than 10 and less than 250 employees, operating in Austria and Hungary. The results indicate that
the relational mechanisms originating from the family social capital may act as substitutes of formal
practices aimed at fostering employee involvement and commitment and that those mechanisms depend
on the extent family involvement in the governance of the business.
ã 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Acquiring, developing, but particularly also keeping talented
individuals have become some of the most important goals of
human resource management (HRM) practices in the past two
decades (Govaerts, Kyndt, Dochy, & Baert, 2011; Hiltrop, 1999).
Organizations that do not succeed in retaining the high performing
workforce lose their ability to remain competitive (Rappaport,
Bancroft, & Okum, 2003) as voluntary turnover can affect various
dimensions of performance, such as productivity and corporate
ﬁnancial performance (Guthrie, 2001; Huselid, 1995; Shaw,
Dineen, Fang, & Vellella, 2009; Sun, Aryee, & Law, 2007).
The recent literature on employee retention has unambiguously
shown that one particular set of HRM practices, known as high
performance work practices (HPWPs), plays a signiﬁcant role
towards the intermediate organizational goal of curbing voluntary
turnover rates. Indeed HPWPs have been shown to positively
inﬂuence employee retention in a variety of sectors (production
and service), settings (unionised and non-unionised, small and
large companies, etc.) and countries (e.g. Combs, Liu, Hall, &
Ketchen, 2006; Karatepe, 2013; Sarikwal & Gupta, 2013).
Also in family ﬁrms, attracting and retaining qualiﬁed employ-
ees and fostering value-creating behaviours can be crucial factors* Corresponding author.
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Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2003; Mitchell, Morse, & Sharma, 2003;
Sieger, Bernhard, & Frey, 2011). The issue in the family business
context might be even more critical because the majority of the
employees usually face a particularly complex and ambiguous
situation, since they are part of the business, but not of the family
system (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006).
Despite the evident conceptual and practical relevance of the
topic, the theoretical and empirical contributions on HRM
practices in family ﬁrms are, however, rather scarce and
fragmented (Botero & Litchﬁeld, 2013; Cruz, Firﬁray, & Gomez-
Mejia, 2011). Further, the existing studies have mainly examined
HRM choices involving family members, while having substantial-
ly overlooked, or addressed only in an indirect way, the role of non-
family personnel (e.g. Astrachan & Kolenko, 1994; Burkart,
Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003; Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & Becerra, 2010;
Dawson, 2012; Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Khanin, Turel, &
Mahto, 2012; Lansberg, 1983; Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino,
2005; Sharma & Irving, 2005).
The existing evidence shows that the extent of use of formal
HPWPs is generally lower in family ﬁrms compared to non-family
ﬁrms, also when size differences are taken into account (e.g. De Kok,
Uhlaner & Thurik, 2006; Pittino & Visintin, 2013). To the contrary,
family ﬁrms appear to prefer informal, often discretionary measures,
often leading (a) to the adoption of unfair compensation and
performance appraisal systems (Barnet & Kellermanns, 2006; Chua,
Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009; Fiegener, Brown, Prince, & File,1994), (b)
to cases of managerial entrenchment (Gomez-Mejia, Nuñez-Nickel,der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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decisions (Spranger, Colarelli, Dimotakis, Jacob, & Arvey, 2012), (d) to
scapegoating of non-family executives and employees (Gomez-
Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, & Makri, 2003), and, generally, (e) to lower
actions for the engagement and worker development of non-family
employees (Cruz, Larraza Kintana, Garcés Galdeano, & Berrone,
2014). For the above-mentioned reasons, a growing number of
studies argue for the need to introduce more formal and equitable
practices. Others argue quite the opposite, and suggest that,
compared to non-family ﬁrms, despite the lower use of formal
HPWPs, family companies are inclined to treat their employees with
higher consideration. Family ﬁrms have been shown to invest in
building cohesive internal communities (Chrisman, Chua, &
Kellermanns, 2009; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Scholnick, 2008;
Miller, Lee, Chang, & Le Breton-Miller, 2009), to be more sensitive to
the quality of life and welfare of their workers (Cennamo, Berrone,
Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012) and to promote employees’ involve-
ment and long-term work relations (Kang & Kim, 2014).
The present work attempts to reconcile these opposing views,
by examining a particular outcome of non-family human resource
management, namely the retention of valuable employees, and by
assessing to what extent HPWPs contribute to this outcome at
various levels of family inﬂuence. In doing this, we draw from a
social exchange theoretical perspective (Blau, 1964; Cropanzano &
Mitchell, 2005). A social exchange view presumes that employ-
ment practices would motivate employees to reciprocate with
performance, commitment and intention to stay (Jia, Shaw, Tsui, &
Park, 2014). Our key argument is that even if family ﬁrms rely less
on formal HPWPs, they achieve high retention results because the
socio-emotional component of the familial management philoso-
phies triggers individual attitudes, and feelings of reciprocation
(Cennamo et al., 2012; Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005) that translate
in lower levels of turnover. We expect such practices to be less
pronounced in non-family ﬁrms and in companies where the
family inﬂuence is lower.
In the empirical analysis, carried out on an original sample of
232 small to medium-sized companies (121 family ﬁrms and
111 non-family ﬁrms) located in Austria and Hungary, we compare
primarily family and non-family ﬁrms. The comparison is relevant,
as family control and inﬂuence have been shown to signiﬁcantly
affect the adoption of informal HR practices at the expense of
formal ones, even in smaller ﬁrms, where the level of formalization
is generally lower compared to large companies (e.g. Aldrich &
Langton, 1997; De Kok et al., 2006; Kotey & Folker, 2007; Pittino &
Visintin, 2013). Thus, we examine whether the family ﬁrm status,
as a distinctive feature affecting HRM practices, has an impact on
employee retention. This focus generates a further motivation for
distinguishing between family and non-family ﬁrms, because in
family ﬁrms the majority of the employees face a particularly
complex and ambiguous situation, since they are part of the
business, but not of the family system (Barnett & Kellermanns,
2006). On the other hand, in non-family ﬁrms we do not observe
this distinction between social groups based on family and
business systems’ overlap. Also, we recognize the need to consider
the heterogeneity among family ﬁrms (Chua, Chrisman, Steier, &
Rau, 2012), and compare different situations of family inﬂuence,
expressed by family versus non-family CEO leadership and ﬁrst
generation versus second and later generation family control.
The study has produced three sets of results: ﬁrst it shows that
the family ﬁrm status and the conditions strengthening the family
inﬂuence on the ﬁrm have a positive impact on retention; second it
shows that in the presence of HPWPs, the “family effect” combines
with the formal practices to produce a positive inﬂuence on
retention; ﬁnally, it also suggests that some of the outcomes of the
family inﬂuence and of the adoption of formal practices may be so
similar that they produce substitution effects on retention.Our results contribute to the literature on both family business
and human resource management. First, we add to the debate on
the management of non-family employees in family ﬁrms by
focusing not only on the adoption of human resource practices, like
most of the studies so far (e.g. Cruz et al., 2014; De Kok et al., 2006;
Reid & Adams, 2001), but also on a signiﬁcant outcome of such
practices, namely the retention of talented non-family employees.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is one of the ﬁrst attempts
to conceptualize and empirically explore the causal link between
HRM practices and behaviours of non-family employees. The
ﬁndings help us to reconcile the previous conﬂicting arguments
about the attitude towards non-family employees in the family
business literature (e.g. Cennamo et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014).
Moreover, we extend the existing work that applies social
exchange theory in family ﬁrms, which so far has been mainly
theoretical (e.g. Barnett, Long, & Marler, 2012; Long & Mathews,
2011; Pearson & Marler, 2010), by empirically testing a typical
response to the social exchange process, namely employees’
intention to stay (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005), and drawing from
the results further conceptual implications on the dimensions of
social exchange in the family business setting.
We also contribute to the HRM literature, and in particular to
the study of HPWPs from a social exchange perspective (Cropan-
zano & Mitchell, 2005; Shaw et al., 2009) and to the research on ﬁt
among HRM practices (Delery, 1998; Guest, Paauwe, & Wright,
2012), showing how the ownership and leadership contexts may
provide social resources that combine with the formal practices
through additive and substitution effects to elicit positive
responses from the employees.
The article is structured as follows. We ﬁrst review the main
theories and empirical ﬁndings on the adoption of HPWPs and
their effects on organizational outcomes. Based on a social
exchange viewpoint, we then develop our hypotheses on the
relationship between HPWPs and the retention of valuable
employees, ﬁrst in family versus non-family ﬁrms, and then in
different types of family ﬁrms. The hypotheses section is followed
by our methods and ﬁndings. Then we conclude with a discussion
of implications and limitations of the study.
2. Employee retention and HPWPs
As mentioned above, activities aimed at acquiring, developing
and keeping talented individuals have become central in the
management of human resources over the last twenty years
(Govaerts et al., 2011; Hiltrop, 1999). HPWPs, a set of speciﬁc
human resources practices developed during the 1990s (Combs
et al., 2006) and including techniques ranging from selective
stafﬁng to employee training, team working and other arrange-
ments illustrated below, have shown to have a positive impact on
employee retention in a variety of settings, including steel mini-
mills (Arthur, 1994), automotive assembly plants (MacDufﬁe,
1995), trucking organizations (Shaw, Gupta, & Delery, 2005), call
centers (Batt, 2002), small ﬁrms across a variety of industries in
both the manufacturing and service sectors (Kerr, Way, & Thacker,
2007; Patel & Conklin, 2012), and publicly held ﬁrms in all major
US industries (Huselid, 1995), as well as across different nations in
North America (e.g. Batt, 2002; Kerr et al., 2007), Europe (Patel &
Conklin, 2012; Razouk, 2011), Asia (Su & Wright, 2012; Wang,
Bruning, & Peng, 2007), and Oceania (Guthrie, 2001).
The impact of HPWPs on employee retention has been shown to
leverage on systems of coherent practices that affect individual
level attitudes and behaviours (Jiang, Lepak, Hu, & Baer, 2012;
Sparham & Sung, 2008; Su & Wright, 2012). In particular, empirical
evidence indicates that the higher the number of HPWPs
employed, the more positive the employee responses (e.g. Delery
& Shaw, 2001; Guest et al., 2004; Macky & Boxall, 2007).
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2006), HPWPs practices can be grouped into three sets according
to the primary goal they pursue. The empirical evidence shows that
all three sets of practices directly or indirectly inﬂuence also the
extent of voluntary turnover. Human capital, motivation and social
exchange theories help explaining the phenomenon.
Skill-enhancing practices, such as selective stafﬁng, intensive
training, and career development, aim at developing the abilities
and self-efﬁcacy of the workforce. Such practices have been shown
to negatively inﬂuence voluntary turnover (see for example Arthur,
1994; Guthrie, 2001). Human capital theory suggests that employ-
ees with high qualiﬁcations tend to learn more easily at work and
as a consequence develop a ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital that would
not be valuable in other occupations (Lepak & Snell, 1999). Indeed,
the more talented and valuable employees, even though have more
opportunities in the labour market, appear to increase their
positive emotional responses to the organization and to be less
attracted by alternative jobs (Jiang et al., 2012; Maertz & Griffeth,
2004; Shaw et al., 2009).
Further, selective stafﬁng (e.g. through selection criteria such as
person-job ﬁt, openness to learn, or the ability to work in teams)
(MacDufﬁe, 1995), can also enhance the commitment of new but
also of existing employees, since a rigorous selection process
signals that only the best are chosen, that the organization offers
good job opportunities, that high performance is required, and that
people matter (Pfeffer, 1994). Likewise, extensive training possi-
bilities by their very nature increase the skills and abilities, but can
also have a positive effect on retention as they help employees to
reach their career goals (Batt, 2002; Huselid, 1995; Stovel & Bontis,
2002). Training and development activities can also be part of more
comprehensive career development initiatives. Transparent career
paths and opportunities can have a positive effect on employee
intention to stay (Jiang et al., 2012), as they enable employees to
extend their abilities through mastering new challenges and
performing a broader set of tasks that may not be offered in
different companies.
Also motivation-enhancing practices, which aim at increasing
the willingness of employees to apply their skills and use their
knowledge in their daily working lives, and to align individual and
organizational interests and goals, have shown to inﬂuence the
extent of job satisfaction and organizational commitment, and
therefore the intention to stay. Among these, the provision of
generous pay and beneﬁts are extensively used to increase
employees’ motivation (Middlebrook, 1999). Although the moti-
vational effect of compensation was also questioned, as extrinsic
rewards could potentially undermine intrinsic motivation (Deci,
1971; Oh & Lewis, 2009), many researchers include some form of
variable compensation, particularly based on individual or
company performance, as part of their proposed set of HPWPs
(Delaney & Huselid, 1996; Patel & Conklin, 2012; Patel, Messer-
smith, & Lepak, 2013; Sels et al., 2006; Wright, Gardner, Moynihan,
& Allen, 2005). Performance appraisals are another HRM tool that
can be used to trigger positive employee attitudes and behaviour,
through providing feedback, clarifying expectations, and discus-
sing career development opportunities (Razouk, 2011). Huselid
(1995) argued that appraisals are particularly effective in retaining
individuals when they are tightly linked to incentive compensation
systems.
Finally, opportunity-enhancing HRM practices, aimed at increas-
ing the empowerment of the employees and at creating
opportunities for them to participate to the decision making
process, have shown to increase the extent of employees’
organizational commitment (Lines, 2004) and intention to stay
(Yücel, 2012). More generally, having a voice in decision-making
processes can be seen as an indicator of respect for a person, and
can lead to an increase in the identiﬁcation with the company (DeCremer, 2002; Lind & Tyler, 1988). Instruments that offer
structured opportunities to participate—for example through
decentralized decision making, autonomy in organizing one’s
own work, consultation and regular information exchange, self-
managed teams, or formal grievance procedures—are also included
in this group of HPWPs (e.g. Patel & Conklin, 2012; Patel et al., 2013;
Prince, Katz, & Kabst, 2011; Sels et al., 2006).
The three sets of HRM practices have been shown to inﬂuence
the extent of retention through another important mechanism that
is well explained by social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Luna-
Arocas, & Camps, 2007; Patel & Conklin, 2012).
According to this approach, the employee–employer relation-
ships are based both on economic and social exchange. Social
exchange relationships rely on mutual obligations, which involve
resources and behaviours that are often difﬁcult to specify and
measure (Blau,1964). From the point of view of the employer, these
behaviours may include, for example, the interest in employee
well-being, stability, and career advancement, as well as more
symbolic dimensions, such as the commitment to promises and
the capacity to ensure fairness and procedural justice (Cropanzano
& Mitchell, 2005; Guest, 1999; Macky & Boxall, 2007; Tsui, Pearce,
Porter, & Tripoli, 1997). On the other hand, the employees may
reciprocate with long-term and open-ended contributions, such as
willingness to learn ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills, availability for tasks that
may fall outside of the formal job description, a high sense of
responsibility, and also a strong intention to stay with the
organization (Shaw, Delery, Jenkins, & Gupta, 1998). The adoption
of HPWPs by the organization has been shown to strengthen the
social dimension of the exchange, thereby stimulating the long-
term commitment of the employees (Macky & Boxall, 2007;
Maertz & Campion, 2004).
Formal HPWPs, however, are not the only mechanism that leads
to the urge of reciprocating by the employees. As it will be
explained in the next section, also informal mechanisms stemming
from peculiar organizational environments or individual behav-
iours by entrepreneurs and top managers may trigger this kind of
phenomenon. In particular, we suggest that some of the familial
informal practices operate at the individual level by reducing the
intention to leave and increasing the retention rate (Combs et al.,
2006).
3. HPWPs and retention of valuable employees: family versus
non-family ﬁrms
A large part of the scant empirical evidence on HRM in family
business shows that the rate of adoption of HPWPs is generally
lower in family ﬁrms compared to their non-family counterparts
(e.g. Carney, 2005; Cruz et al., 2014; De Kok et al., 2006; Pittino &
Visintin, 2013; Stewart & Hitt, 2012). Family ﬁrms appear to prefer
informal, often discretionary, mechanisms and “familial logics” in
the management of human resources rather than formalised
systems, particularly at small and medium organizational sizes
(Pittino & Visintin, 2013).
Small to medium sized ﬁrms are generally less inclined to adopt
formalized managerial practices (including HRM techniques),
regardless of their family business status. However, both theoreti-
cal arguments and empirical evidence support the idea that family
ownership and management are associated with an even stronger
propensity to privilege informal HRM systems (e.g. De Kok et al.,
2006; Kotey & Folker, 2007; Pittino & Visintin, 2013; Reid & Adams,
2001). For example, De Kok et al. (2006), examining the adoption of
professional HRM practices among small and medium companies,
ﬁnd the family business status to be signiﬁcantly related to a lower
degree of adoption of formalized HR practices, after controlling for
ﬁrm size and various indexes of organizational complexity. Similar
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(2001).
One of the main reasons behind this phenomenon is the
decisive inﬂuence of the family social system in shaping, through
mechanisms of isomorphism, the characteristics of the organiza-
tional system. The emphasis on informality, trust, interpersonal
ties, tacit and shared norms and values that characterizes the
family relationships is likely to be imprinted in the organizational
processes and routines, inﬂuencing also the HR practices (e.g.
Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007; Brannon, Wiklund, & Haynie,
2013; Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013)
The prevalence of informal HR systems has led several authors
to argue for an inadequacy of family ﬁrms in attracting, managing
and retaining the employees, particularly the talented ones, based
on the argument that the latter may prefer to work in a more
transparent environment, where opportunities to grow and
participate are well-deﬁned and clear-cut (Barnet & Kellermanns,
2006; Chua et al., 2009; Fiegener et al., 1994).
So far, studies are missing that speciﬁcally analyse the
organizational outcomes of such informal practices. Out of the
four mechanisms mentioned above, we argue that familial
informal HR practices generate peculiar forms of social exchanges,
which positively inﬂuence retention, even of those valuable
employees who are typically the targets of human resource
management practices, as testiﬁed by the ever growing literature
on talent management (for a review see Collings & Mellahi, 2009).
In the past few years, a number of studies have employed social
exchange theory to explain what mechanisms shape individual
family business members’ attitudes and behaviours towards
pursuing transgenerational, collective, and not only economic
goals (Barnett et al., 2012; De Massis, 2012a, 2012b; Long &
Mathews, 2011). In particular, Long and Mathews (2011) argue that
family ﬁrms are typically characterised by a so called Generalised
Exchange System (GES) which is based on norms of unilateral and
indirect reciprocity, whereby there are no expectations among
family members of an immediate and direct return for an action.
This type of exchange is based on friendship, kinship and affection
and leads to behaviours that are cooperative, homogeneous and
cohesive. Non-family ﬁrms, on the contrary, tend to be closer to a
restrictive type of exchange, whereby individuals tend to pursue
self-interest in forms of exchange that are typically mutual and
direct, based on a quid pro quo mentality (Uehara, 1990 as quoted
by Long & Mathews, 2011; p. 290). Such ﬁrms most closely
resemble Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) nexus of contracts in which
relations are of the market variety (e.g. economic agency) with an
emphasis on direct/mutual reciprocity, formal/prescribed inter-
actions, and hierarchical arrangements of the legalistic (Weber,
1978) and universalistic (Carney, 2005) kind. In these settings,
primary exchanges are signiﬁcantly instrumental, impersonal, and
time-limited, as are the underlying obligations and expectations of
the contracted participants’ (p. 292). On the other hand, the
dominant coalition running a family business (even though in
different degrees according to the peculiar characteristics of the
coalition itself), shapes individual behaviours within a long-term,
trust-based, non-economic framework.
In line with Barnett et al. (2012), and Pearson and Marler (2010),
we argue that the typical GES that characterises individual
attitudes and behaviours of family members extends so as to
shape also the behaviours of non-family employees.
It is well established in the literature that those managerial
philosophies that are the basis of the familial GES aim at
maximising a utility function that includes many goals other than
proﬁt, typically connected with the long-term survival of the
company and the overall economic, social and emotional well
being of the family members and future descendants (e.g. Berrone,
Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012; Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett,2012; Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-
Fuentes, 2007; Zellweger, Nason, Nordqvist, & Brush, 2013). Those
same philosophies typically leverage on strategies that follow
predictable trajectories of change based on cumulative, tacit
knowledge developed and shared with employees, customers,
suppliers and other signiﬁcant stakeholders (Le Breton Miller &
Miller, 2006) and inspired by mutual trust (rather than formal non-
disclosure agreements), personal respect and intimate knowledge.
Besides the goal of building and maintaining the company’s
strategic knowledge capital, the development of a cohesive and
long-lasting community of employees also serves the perpetuation
of a positive family image and reputation among the stakeholders
(Dyer & Whetten, 2006; Zellweger et al., 2013) and the enhance-
ment of the family business’ social capital endowment and
network of binding social ties (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005).
To achieve these goals, family ﬁrms tend to emphasize loyalty
and caring for workers (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006), attention
for the quality of life and welfare of the employees (Stavrou &
Swiercz, 1998), more stable employment (Block, 2010; Stavrou,
Kassinis, & Filotheou, 2007), and the implementation of more
“protective” contractual features for non-family personnel (Cen-
namo et al., 2012). Under such conditions non-family employees
experience a feeling of proximity to the family owners and perceive
that they are being looked after and taken care of with a long-term
perspective (Block, 2010; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006), even in
periods of crisis (see also Bammens, Van Gils, & Voordeckers, 2010;
Bernhard & O’Driscoll, 2011; Miller et al., 2008, 2009). These
feelings of loyalty and gratitude, combined with the perception
that the organization invests in employment relations with a long-
time horizon (Berrone et al., 2012; Cennamo et al., 2012; Cruz et al.,
2011) are likely to reduce the intentions to leave also among those
valuable employees who have other options in the labour market
(Shaw et al., 2009).
Besides social exchange mechanisms, also processes of
organizational identiﬁcation (Carmon et al., 2010; Vallejo &
Langa, 2010) and cultural ﬁt may (Cruz et al., 2011) inﬂuence the
extent of retention. Family image, history and values might
promote empathy with the family by the non-family employees
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Zellweger et al., 2013), often
being an example to follow and a goal to aim for. The process of
social identiﬁcation favours the emergence of feelings of
psychological ownership, affective commitment and job satisfac-
tion (e.g. Avey, Luthans, & Jensen, 2009; Sieger, Zellweger, &
Aquino, 2013; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004), thus reducing employ-
ees’ intention to quit.
Non-family ﬁrms, on the other hand, do not experience the
translation into the business of the familial traits of reciprocity,
trust, shared norms and values. Long-term orientation may be also
weaker as business owners and leaders might be more focused on
short-term horizons. It is, for example, the case of outside investors
or serial entrepreneurs. Thus, non-family ﬁrms might be less able
to leverage on certain informal dimensions of the social exchange
and need higher levels of formal practices to increase the degree of
retention (Le Breton Miller & Miller, 2006).
In light of these features, we could argue that family ﬁrms,
compared to their non-family counterparts, possess an advantage
in terms of symbolic resources and behaviours that trigger feelings
of reciprocation by the employees that non-family ﬁrms have
difﬁculties in achieving.
As mentioned before, the empirical evidence appears to show
an additive relationship among skill enhancing, motivation
enhancing and engagement enhancing HPWPs practices (Combs
et al., 2006). We propose that informal familial practices
complement HPWPs in retaining the employees, particularly by
strengthening the feelings of obligation and reciprocation
described above.
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formal HPWPs, family ﬁrms will show a higher level of retention of
employees thanks to the use of the above-mentioned informal
practices, or, in equivalent terms, that family ﬁrms may need lower
levels of HPWPs compared to non-family ﬁrms to achieve the same
level of retention of employees. The above argument is summa-
rized in the following:
Hypothesis 1. Family ﬁrms will perform better than non-family
ﬁrms in the retention of valuable employees at any level of
adoption of HPWPs.
HR practices could also produce substitute effects (the
organizational beneﬁts arising from the adoption of two practices
is respectively the same as the beneﬁts that would arise from the
adoption of a single practice) (Delery, 1998). We propose that
informal familial practices may combine with HPWPs through
partial substitute effects in retaining the employees, as far as the
social exchange determinants of retention is concerned. In
particular, the family ﬁrms’ attention towards trans-generational
sustainability (e.g. Zellweger et al., 2013), the willingness to
establish and preserve a cohesive community of employees (e.g.
Cruz et al., 2011; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005), and also the
tendency to promote employees’ spontaneous involvement in
informal innovation activities (e.g. Bammens, Notelaers, & Van
Gils, 2015) can be seen as substitutes of those HPWPs aimed at
increasing the perception of organizational long-term investments
in employees’ skills (e.g. Huselid, 1995; Pfeffer, 1994) and those
aimed at strengthening employees’ participation and sense of
belonging (e.g. Patel & Conklin, 2012). Thus, in family ﬁrms the
informal HR practices grounded on the emotional bond with the
family may make redundant some the formal HPWPs aimed at
affecting the perception of social exchange by the employees. In
other words, an increase in HPWPs adoption may translate in lower
positive effects than in non-family ﬁrms.
Hypothesis 2. In family ﬁrms the marginal effect of an increased
adoption of HPWPs may be lower compared to non-family
ﬁrms.
4. The effects in different types of family ﬁrms
Family ﬁrms should not be treated as a homogeneous group
(Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005; Zahra, Hayton, & Salvato, 2004),
especially regarding their emphasis on socioemotional dimensions
(e.g., Berrone et al., 2012). In light of our theoretical framework it is
therefore appropriate to explore how existing differences within
family ﬁrms inﬂuence the relationships between HPWPs and the
retention of valuable employees. We focus on two sources of
heterogeneity that have been indicated as being strongly related to
the importance of socioemotional goals in family ﬁrms, namely
family CEO versus non-family CEO leadership and the family
generation involved in the business (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2007).
4.1. Family vs. non-family CEO family ﬁrms
The presence of a family CEO is usually associated with a higher
emphasis on the protection and enhancement of the family ﬁrm’s
socioemotional wealth, in comparison to situations where family
owners delegate the company leadership to a professional non-
family executive (e.g. Berrone et al., 2012; DeTienne & Chirico,
2013).
It is certainly possible (and even common) that also non-family
CEOs exhibit high levels of cultural congruence with the family and
are loyal to its values and goals (e.g. Blumentritt, Keyt, & Astrachan,
2007; Hall & Nordqvist, 2008). However, a family CEO, by virtue ofthe kinship ties, the shared family name, and the reference to the
common family history is more likely to promote a common
identity and a stronger “family vision” within the organization
(Arregle et al., 2007; Barnett et al., 2012). It has been suggested that
a strong family vision, deﬁned as the shared intention within the
dominant coalition for the transgenerational sustainability of the
ﬁrm (Chrisman et al., 2012), is associated to the establishment of
norms of reciprocity that broaden the scope of the social exchange.
In particular, as the family vision becomes stronger, the exchange
system of the organization moves from a restricted type, which is
characterized by a transactional and bilateral view of reciprocity, to
a generalized type, which involves a “serial” view of reciprocity and
a focus on the collective interest (Long & Mathews, 2011). The
exchange system affects both family and non-family employees
(Pearson & Marler, 2010). Thus, if non-family employees are
involved in a generalized exchange system that leverages on
group-based and long-term obligations among organizational
members, they are more likely to experience feelings of commit-
ment and lower intentions to leave (Barnett et al., 2012).
Moreover, as observed by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007), the
stronger the role of the family in the ownership and management,
the more the company will adopt strategies to satisfy its
socioemotional priorities, including the preservation of long-
lasting relationships with the employees (Berrone, Cruz, &
Gomez-Mejia, 2014). The direct involvement of a family member
in the most important top executive position also reinforces the
interaction between the owning family and the company stake-
holders (e.g. Block & Wagner, 2010). Moreover, it has been
suggested that strong levels of family commitment and identiﬁ-
cation with the ﬁrm, expressed by the presence of a family CEO,
can create similar feelings among employees. Zahra et al. (2008),
for example, report empirical evidence of a “social contagion” of
commitment attitudes: when one member of an organization
behaves in a committed fashion, it increases the probability that
other members will also experience higher identiﬁcation and
commitment to the organization (Barsade, 2002). According to
Rhoades and Eisenberger (2002), the organization’s leaders are
the main inﬂuencers of employee commitment. Whereas the
social contagion effect can occur also in presence of a non-family
CEO, who can be a good role model for the non-family members,
we assume that a family CEO usually exhibits the strongest levels
of commitment to the family vision of the business, and this is the
main trigger of imitative attitudes by the employees. Hence,
family CEO leadership is likely to produce an overall improve-
ment of non-family employees’ feelings of psychological owner-
ship and affective commitment, thereby reducing the intentions
to leave.
Consistent with the arguments already developed in support to
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, we therefore suggest that at any
given level of adoption of HPWPs, family ﬁrms led by a family CEO
have an advantage in the retention of valuable employees
compared to family ﬁrms led by a non-family CEO, thanks to
stronger expected feelings of reciprocation and higher extent of
commitment and identiﬁcation.
Hypothesis 3. For a given level of adoption of HPWPs, family
ﬁrms with a family CEO achieve higher retention of valuable
employees compared to family ﬁrms with a non-family CEO.
However, in the situations of family CEO leadership, the
immaterial and symbolic resources exchanged with the employees
may present a higher overlap with the social-exchange effects of
some HPWPs. Thus, as a consequence of a possible substitution
effect, the marginal effect of an increased use of HPWPs on the
retention of valuable employees may be less pronounced in family
ﬁrms led by a family CEO in comparison to those led by a non-
family CEO. Therefore it follows that:
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the retention of valuable employees may be lower in family
ﬁrms with a family CEO in comparison to family ﬁrms with a
non-family CEO.
4.2. First generation vs. later generation family ﬁrms
There is widespread agreement in the family business literature
that family identiﬁcation, family inﬂuence and personal invest-
ments in the company are at their highest levels in the founding,
ﬁrst generation stage, and decrease as the ﬁrm moves into
subsequent stages of family ownership and leadership (e.g.
Gersick, Lansberg, Desjardins, & Dunn, 1999; Gomez-Mejia et al.,
2007; Le-Breton Miller & Miller, 2013; Ward & Aronoff, 1994). In
ﬁrst generation family ﬁrms, the social systems of family and
organization are largely isomorphic (Arregle et al., 2007; Sirmon &
Hitt, 2003), since the actors involved are usually members of a
nuclear family and there is a predominant role of the founder
(Schein, 1983). The founding families have a deep emotional
attachment to the companies they have built and strong affective
ties with the non-family employees, which have helped the ﬁrm to
survive and grow throughout the initial difﬁculties (Le Breton-
Miller & Miller, 2013). In ﬁrst generation family companies, the
main socioemotional goal is the transmission of the business to
later generations, and this results in an enhanced long-term
perspective of business strategies and stakeholders’ relationships
(Berrone et al., 2014; Zellweger et al., 2013). Although in ﬁrst
generation companies the inﬂuence of the family is limited in
comparison to the paramount role of the founder (e.g. Cruz &
Nordqvist, 2012), the “dynastic priorities” of the family business
are at their highest levels (e.g. Arregle et al., 2007). Founders feel
the responsibility to provide long-term beneﬁts for family
members, mainly by securing the family control of the ﬁrm
beyond the founding generation. As founders tend to view their
businesses as extensions of themselves (Schein, 1983), they strive
for the perpetuation of their entrepreneurial effort by transferring
a business legacy to future generations, (Dyer & Whetten, 2006). By
virtue of their roles as heads of families and business leaders,
founders aim at protecting and promoting the family business
reputation, and the continuation of their business lineage (
Athanassiou, Crittenden, Kelly, & Marquez, 2002; Lim, Lubatkin, &
Wiseman, 2013). These factors are consistent with a strong family
vision within the business and thus reinforce the broad scope and
the collective dimension of social exchange, involving also non-
family employees (Barnett et al., 2012)
As the family ﬁrm proceeds to second and later generation
stages, the overlap between family and organization diminishes,
the family members’ emotional attachment and identiﬁcation
become progressively weaker, the socioemotional priorities are
generally less pronounced, more fragmented and more focused on
short-term needs of individual family members (e.g. Gomez-Mejia
et al., 2007; Miller, Minichilli, & Corbetta, 2013).
We might therefore expect that ﬁrst generation family ﬁrms,
compared to post-founder and later generation ones, have a more
intense exchange of immaterial resources with non-family
employees in the form of more intense and meaningful informal
practices. This is likely to create an advantage in the capacity to
retain valuable non-family personnel. From this it follows:
Hypothesis 5. At any given level of adoption of HPWPs, ﬁrst
generation family ﬁrms achieve a higher retention of valuable
employees compared to second and later generation family
ﬁrms.
Also, as a consequence of a possible substitution effect between
the use of HPWPs and the informal relational system and symbolicinvolvement experienced by the non-family employees in ﬁrst-
generation companies we may expect the following:
Hypothesis 6. The effect of an increase in HPWPs on the
retention of valuable employees may be lower in ﬁrst
generation family ﬁrms in comparison to second and later
generation family ﬁrms.
5. Sample and method
5.1. Sample
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a quantitative study
based on a sample of companies from two European countries,
Austria and Hungary. The sample was taken from the same two
industries, “manufacture of food products” and “manufacture of
computer, electronic and optical products/manufacture of electri-
cal equipment” in both countries. The CMDcomplete (Austria) and
OPTEN (Hungary) databases were used to identify executive board
members and managing directors of companies within these
industries. As micro enterprises were considered as being unlikely
to have systematic HPWPs in place, businesses with less than ten
employees were excluded from the list.
We sent personalized e-mails with a link to the online survey
instrument to 1649 managers (917 in Austria, 732 in Hungary),
guaranteed anonymity following Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and
Podsakoff’s (2003) advice, and used a multiple contact method
(with two reminders after the ﬁrst e-mail) as suggested by Dillman,
Smyth, and Christian (2009), yielding a gross response rate of
20.3%. Of the 335 respondents, those who were not in a top
management position or insufﬁciently ﬁlled out the questionnaire
were excluded. Eventually, 232 questionnaires were used in the
analysis, representing a net response rate of 14.1% overall (15.5% in
Austria and 12.3% in Hungary), which is somewhat lower than in
prior empirical studies related to HPWPs while comparing
favourably to the typical 10–12% response rate of surveys among
top managers (Geletkanycz, 1997). 97 companies in our ﬁnal
sample have between 10 and 50 empoyees, 135 have more than
50 employees.
5.2. Instrument design
The survey instrument was developed following a three-step
process. First, the literature was reviewed for existing and tested
scales for measuring the main constructs. The draft questionnaire
was peer-reviewed by researchers with experience in the ﬁeld of
HRM. In line with the suggestion of Dillman et al. (2009), a pre-test
was then conducted among approximately ten per cent of the
target group (17 companies) following a similar process as the later
main study. The purpose of the pre-test was to test the
questionnaire, both regarding respondents’ answering behaviour
(e.g. break-up points) as well as regarding the internal consistency
of the constructs. Following the pre-test and a preliminary factor
analysis, the questionnaire was slightly adapted (some items that
did not contribute to the factor loading were removed, others
reformulated). In order to explore whether the items used
appropriately contribute to the constructs they ought to measure,
rotated principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted for
each construct. As a general rule, items with factor loadings above
0.5 were kept. Following Backhaus, Erichson, Plinke, and Weiber’s
(2003) recommendation, we also tested whether the data was
actually suitable for PCA. The results of Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
measure of sampling adequacy, Bartlett’s test of sphericity, and
the anti-image correlation matrix indicated that PCA was an
adequate tool. Based on the ﬁndings from the test of the
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scales, the questionnaire was adapted with minor changes.
The instrument was originally developed in English. The ﬁnal
questionnaire was then translated into German and Hungarian.
Standard back-translation procedures were used followed by small
adaptations to ensure that the questions had the same meaning in
all languages.
5.3. Variables
Employee retention was measured by the respondents’ subjec-
tive assessment of their ﬁrm’s relative performance in retaining
what the top management considers as valuable employees over
the last two years, compared to ﬁrms of similar sales volume in
their industry on a ﬁve-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1
(signiﬁcantly below industry average) to 5 (signiﬁcantly above
industry average). Although an objective measure for retention
rates would be preferable, top managers are often unaware of the
exact numbers at the time when they ﬁll out the survey. Retention
research commonly uses employee turnover as a measure for
studying retention (Guthrie, 2001; Patel & Conklin, 2012).
However, since there are several ways of calculating employee
turnover, comparability could not be ensured. There are reports
from prior research about signiﬁcant correlations between
objective and subjective measures of performance (Dess &
Robinson, 1984). We therefore followed the example of other
authors (Delaney & Huselid,1996; Hau-siu Chow, 2004; Shaw et al.,
2009) in using a subjective assessment of the ﬁrm’s performance in
retaining valuable employees over the last two years compared to
similar ﬁrms in the industry. To establish the robustness of our
results, however, we performed additional tests of our hypotheses
employing the overall turnover rate as dependent variable (in the
questionnaire, we also included a question about the percentage of
employees who left the company during the previous year).
The adoption of High Performance Work Practices was assessed
calculating the average values of the scores for six HPWP
categories, obtained as averages of the equally weighted items
that together constitute the individual categories. The selection of
high-performance work practices items was based on the
classiﬁcation in: selective stafﬁng, intensive training, career
development, extensive compensation and beneﬁts, performance
appraisals, and employee participation. The individual items were
adapted from prior HPWP studies of various authors (e.g. Patel &
Conklin, 2012; Sels et al., 2006) (see the Appendix A for a detailed
overview of the scales and their a-levels that range between
a = 0.698 and a = 0.836) and were measured on a ﬁve-point Likert-
type scale (from 1 = very little or no importance to 5 = very
important).
Given the nature of our HPWPs and retention measures, we
assessed the potential of common method bias in the dataTable 1
Means, standard deviations and correlations.
Mean SD 1 2 3 
1 Retention 4.12 0.80 1.00
2 HPWPs 3.64 0.62 0.33 1.00
3 Past performance 3.43 1.05 0.35 0.28 
4 Sizeb 0.58 – 0.18 0.46 
5 High technologyb 0.38 – 0.07 0.15 
6 Company nationalityb 0.62 – 0.08 0.01 
7 Family ﬁrmb 0.52 – 0.02 0.16 
8 Family CEOb 0.39 – 0.01 0.16 
9 First Generationa,b 0.48 – 0.02 0.01 
N = 232; Correlations higher than 0.15 and lower than 0.14 are signiﬁcant at 0.05 level
variable assumes value 1.
a N = 121.
b Binary variables.performing Harman’s one-factor test (Harman, 1967; Podsakoff
et al., 2003), which is regularly used in dealing with this issue also
in family business studies (e.g. Sieger et al., 2013). We entered all
the items of our study into a factor analysis, extracting an 8-factor
solution, accounting for 65.48% of total variance. The ﬁrst factor
explained 14.85% of variance, suggesting that common method
bias is not a major problem because no single factor accounts for
the majority of variance.
Family ﬁrm status is a dichotomous variable assuming value 1 if
a family is reported as the controlling owner of the company with
the absolute majority of ownership stakes, and 0 otherwise
(Andres, 2008). In the case of family ﬁrms, we also surveyed
whether the CEO is a family member (dichotomous variable Family
CEO assuming value 1 if a family member holds the CEO position
and 0 otherwise) and whether the ﬁrm is in ﬁrst generation or later
generation family ownership (First Generation, dichotomous
variable, assuming value 1 if the family is in the ﬁrst generation
of involvement in the company, and 0 otherwise).
Following previous studies of HPWPs and employee retention,
we included as control variables: (1) a binary measure accounting
for companies belonging to high technology industries, (2) a
measure of ﬁnancial performance over the past three years (in
terms of ROA), (3) company size, operationalized through a
dichotomous variable assuming value 0 if the ﬁrm has a number
of employees between 10 and 49, and value 1 if it has more than
50 employees), (4) company nationality, assuming value 1 if the
company belongs to the sample from Austria and 0 if the company
belongs to the sample from Hungary.
Descriptive statistics and correlation for all the study variables
are reported in Table 1.
5.4. Estimation technique
We used hierarchical ordinary least squares regression models
to test the hypotheses. In step 1 of each hierarchical model, we
entered the control variables; in step 2 we added the HPWPs index.
In step 3, we added the family ﬁrm status (in the model testing
Hypothesis 1), presence of a family CEO (Hypothesis 3), and ﬁrst
generation family ﬁrm (Hypothesis 5). In step 4 we added the
interaction terms between HPWPs and family status (model
testing Hypothesis 2), HPWPs and family CEO (Hypothesis 4) and
HPWPs and ﬁrst generation stage (Hypothesis 6). We used the
signiﬁcance of the family ﬁrm status, family CEOs and ﬁrst
generation coefﬁcients plus the explained variance changes from
step 2 to step 3 to determine support for Hypothesis 1,Hypothesis
3, Hypothesis 5, respectively. The explained variance change, the
signiﬁcance of the interaction term and the plotted form of the
interaction effect (if signiﬁcant) were used to determine the
support for Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 4, Hypothesis 6.4 5 6 7 8 9
1.00
0.22 1.00
0.09 0.13 1.00
0.15 0.10 0.06 1.00
0.15 0.12 0.08 0.12 1.00
0.08 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.77 1.00
0.06 0.07 0.35 0.30 – 0.06 1.00
. The mean in case of binary variables indicates the ratio of observations where the
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6.1. Descriptive analysis
After splitting our sample and breaking down the overall
indicator of HPWPs in its single components (Table 2), we observe
that: (1) family ﬁrms present a lower degree of adoption of HPWPs
compared to their non-family counterparts; (2) the lower intensity
of adoption is homogeneous across the different subsets of
practices; (3) the index of valuable employees’ retention is higher
in family ﬁrms compared to non-family ones; (4) within family
ﬁrms, companies led by a non-family CEO and companies where
second or later family generations are involved exhibit a higher
intensity of HPWPs use.
6.2. Regression analyses
6.2.1. Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2
It was hypothesized that family businesses achieve better
performances in the retention of valuable employees compared to
non-family businesses, holding ﬁxed the rate of HPWPs adoption.
Table 3 presents the results of the hierarchical regression model
with the retention of valuable employees as the dependent
variable and the stepwise inclusion of the explanatory terms.
Our analysis shows that HPWPs are strongly and positively
related with the retention of valuable employees (b = 0.21,
p < 0.001). When we add the family ﬁrm status in step 3, we
observe that the direct average effect of HPWPs remains
substantially unchanged and the family business status has a
positive and signiﬁcant impact on the dependent variable (b = 0.12,
p < 0.05). This provides support to our Hypothesis 1: after
controlling for the intensity of HPWPs adoption, family ﬁrms on
average exhibit a higher capacity to retain valuable employees.
Hypothesis 2 stipulates that family ﬁrm status and HPWPs
adoption interact in such a way that in family ﬁrms there is a
lower sensitivity of valuable employees’ retention to the increase
of HPWPs. Step 4 in the hierarchical regression (Table 3) includes
the interaction term between family ﬁrm status and HPWPs. The
signiﬁcant improvement of the R-squared indicates that the
inclusion of the interaction term enhances the explanatory power
of our model. The interaction term is also signiﬁcant and negative
(b = 0.19, p < 0.10), indicating that the effect of HPWPs is
weakened by the family business status.
The relationships proposed in Hypothesis 1 and 2 can be
appreciated in the plot of Fig. 1 depicting the signiﬁcant
interaction. It can be observed that: (1) on average family ﬁrms
have a higher capacity to retain valuable employees given a certain
level of HPWPs, and this indicates that there is some kind of
additive effect between formal practices and informal dimensions
of the exchange, but (2) the effect of an increase in HPWPs on
retention is lower in family ﬁrms compared to non-family ﬁrms,Table 2
HPWPs and retention: descriptive analyses.
Family ﬁrms Non-family ﬁrms Family CEO 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D
Selective stafﬁng 3.46 0.91 3.86 0.91 3.44 0.5
Intensive training 3.58 0.76 3.76 0.85 3.52 0.9
Career development 3.65 0.73 3.84 0.80 3.62 0.7
Extensive compensation 3.23 0.82 3.43 0.89 3.23 0.7
Performance appraisals 3.65 0.76 3.83 0.84 3.59 0.7
Employee participation 3.70 0.68 3.79 0.69 3.69 0.7
Total HPWPs 3.54 0.58 3.75 0.65 3.54 0.7
Retention 4.19 0.81 3.88 0.85 4.17 0.8
N 121 111 30 and this suggests that there is also a partial substitution effect that
makes the combination between HPWPs and family ﬁrm status
“sub-additive.”
These results are robust across different speciﬁcations of the
model. In particular, the effects remain unchanged if we use the
percentage of overall employee turnover as our dependent variable
(Table 5). The use of HPWPs and the family business status have a
negative impact on the overall turnover rate, and the effect on the
reduction of turnover rate of an increase in HPWPs adoption is
lower in family ﬁrms. Further results in support of our hypotheses
are found in additional analyses that assess the effect of each
subset of practices in the family and non-family business
subsample. In the family business subsample, the HPWPs
especially aimed at increasing employee participation and
involvement do not have an impact on the retention of valuable
employees (Table 6).
6.2.2. Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 3 suggests that, within family ﬁrms, companies led
by a family CEO achieve a better performance in valuable employee
retention compared to those where a non-family CEO is in charge
(given a certain level of HPWPs). Regression results reported in
Table 4 do not provide support to the hypothesis. The effect of
HPWPs on retention is conﬁrmed but there is no evidence of a
“family CEO” effect (b = 0.01, not signiﬁcant). However there is
some evidence in support of a substitution effect (Hypothesis 4).
The interaction term entered in step 4a is negative and marginally
signiﬁcant (b = 0.13, p < 0.10), and this suggests that HPWPs have
a stronger incremental effect when a non-family CEO is in charge,
although, on average there are no differences in the degrees of
retention between family and non-family CEO family ﬁrms.
6.2.3. Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6
We hypothesized (Hypothesis 5) that, within family ﬁrms,
companies where the founding generation is involved achieve a
higher retention of valuable employees compared to second and
later generation family ﬁrms. We ﬁnd some support to this
hypothesis: the coefﬁcient of the First Generation term entered at
step 3b is signiﬁcant at a borderline level (b = 0.15, p < 0.10). On the
other hand, the substitution argument of Hypothesis 6 is not
supported: the coefﬁcient of the interaction term entered in the
step 4b is of the expected sign, but not signiﬁcant (b = 0.13, not
signiﬁcant).
7. Discussion
The literature on human resource management practices in
family ﬁrms disagrees about the attitude of the owning family
towards non-family employees: it is unclear whether family ﬁrms
“care more” or “care less” about their personnel compared to non-
family ﬁrms (e.g. Cennamo et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014).Non-family CEO First generation Second or later generation
. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
7 3.52 0.63 3.55 0.61 3.53 0.56
2 3.74 0.87 3.46 0.92 3.46 0.90
7 3.73 0.71 3.63 0.76 3.53 0.75
2 3.21 0.76 3.28 0.78 3.66 0.67
9 3.79 0.91 3.68 0.76 3.16 0.85
7 3.74 0.68 3.61 0.72 3.60 0.75
6 3.62 0.74 3.61 0.67 3.79 0.62
3 4.20 0.76 4.23 0.78 4.11 0.78
91 59 62
Table 3
OLS regression analysis with dependent variable Retention of valuable employees: comparison between family and non family ﬁrms.
(1)
Control Variables
(2)
HPWP and Control Variables
(3)
Direct Effect Family vs. Non-family Firms
(4)
Two-way interaction
Previous Performance 0.21***
(0.05)
0.21***
(0.05)
0.20***
(0.05)
0.19***
(0.05)
Size 0.00
(0.05)
0.00
(0.05)
0.00
(0.05)
0.00
(0.04)
High technology industry 0.02
(0.10)
0.02
(0.10)
0.03
(0.10)
0.03
(0.10)
Company Nationality 0.06
(0.10)
0.06
(0.10)
0.06
(0.10)
0.06
(0.10)
HPWPs 0.21***
(0.09)
0.20***
(0.12)
0.32***
(0.08)
Family ﬁrm 0.12*
(0.07)
0.21y
(0.18)
HPWP  Family ﬁrm 0.19**
(0.12)
Constant 3.99*** 3.95*** 3.96*** 3.96***
(0.22) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
N 232 232 232 232
R-sq 0.14 0.24 0.29 0.34
Adjusted R-sq 0.10 0.20 0.26 0.31
F statistic 7.38*** 8.38*** 7.93*** 7.19***
R-sq change 0.10*** 0.15*** 0.20***
F for R-sq change 8.33*** 4.21*** 6.63***
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, yp < 0.1.
Table 4
OLS regression analysis with dependent variable Retention of valuable employees: different types of family ﬁrms.
(1) Control
Variables
(2) HPWP and
Control Variables
(3a) Direct effect
Family CEO
(4a) Two-way interaction (3b) Direct effect First Generation (4b) Two-way
interaction
Previous Performance 0.19***
(0.06)
0.19***
(0.06)
0.18***
(0.06)
0.18***
(0.06)
0.19***
(0.06)
0.18***
(0.06)
Size 0.12
(0.08)
0.12
(0.08)
0.12
(0.08)
0.11
(0.08)
0.12
(0.08)
0.13y
(0.08)
High technology industry 0.04
(0.15)
0.04
(0.15)
0.04
(0.15)
0.04
(0.15)
0.09
(0.15)
0.11
(0.16)
Company Nationality 0.01
(0.10)
0.01
(0.10)
0.01
(0.10)
0.01
(0.10)
0.06
(0.15)
0.04
(0.15)
HPWPs 0.20***
(0.08)
0.20***
(0.05)
0.14**
(0.05)
0.20***
(0.08)
0.18**
(0.09)
Family CEO 0.01
(0.12)
0.01
(0.16)
First Generation 0.12y
(0.10)
0.15y
(0.15)
HPWP * Family CEO 0.13y
(0.10)
HPWP * First Generation 0.13
(0.14)
Constant 3.82*** 3.78*** 3.78*** 3.70*** 3.96*** 3.96***
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
N 121 121 121 121 121 121
R-sq 0.08 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.21
Adjusted R-sq 0.06 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.16
F statistic 3.52*** 5.52*** 4.57*** 4.46*** 4.00*** 4.30***
R-sq change 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
F for R-sq change 6.32*** 0.92y 1.01 0.54 0.88
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, yp < 0.1.
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observing the relationship between the adoption of HPWPs and
the retention of valuable employees, through a social exchange
framework. This perspective allows us to consider the actual
response of non-family employees to the activation of certain
human resource practices, and reveals that employees in family
ﬁrms might beneﬁt from the high quality of relationships enabled
by the family inﬂuence (Barnett et al., 2012; Pearson & Marler,2010), that combines with the formal HPWPs in stimulating
retention. Therefore, the lower degree of adoption of HPWPs does
not mean that family ﬁrms care less about their workforce.
In particular, in support of hypothesis 1, we show that at even
very low levels of HPWPs adoption, the degree of retention of
valuable employees by family ﬁrms is higher than that by non-
family ﬁrms. This means that, notwithstanding the potential
negative impacts of a number of familial discretionary practices
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Fig. 1. Effect of HPWPs on the retention of valuable employees in family and non
family ﬁrms.
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goating and so on, the positive ones connected with the
Generalised Exchange Structures typical of family ﬁrms are even
stronger (Long & Mathews, 2011). Therefore, although family ﬁrms
rely less than their non-family counterparts on formal HPWPs (as
also conﬁrmed by our descriptive statistics), their rate of retention
is not systematically lower but may be similar or even higher. By
clarifying the causal link between HRM practices, family inﬂuence
and employee retention in family ﬁrms, this result provides
indirect support to the idea that the pursuit of socioemotional
priorities and goals at the family level improves the quality of the
social exchange with non-family employees, and this is in line with
previous conceptual arguments on the social exchange in the
family business context (Barnett et al., 2012; Long & Mathews,
2011; Pearson & Marler, 2010).
As a further speciﬁcation of this argument, the empirical
evidence in support of Hypothesis 2 shows that the impact of the
adoption of HPWPs on retention is marginally lower in family
businesses at any level of adoption of formal practices. This result
can be interpreted by viewing family inﬂuence as a source of
informal HRM practices that are committed in the social exchangeTable 5
Robustness check: OLS regression analysis with dependent variable Overall turnover ra
(1) Control Variables (2) HPWP and Control Variabl
Previous Performance 1.19***
(0.44)
1.19***
(0.44)
Size 1.92***
(0.51)
1.91***
(0.51)
High technology industry 1.75y
(0.94)
1.75y
(0.94)
Company Nationality 0.27
(0.93)
0.27
(0.93)
HPWPs 1.43***
(0.52)
Family ﬁrm 
HPWP  Family ﬁrm 
Constant 10.01*** 10.10*** 
(2.22) (2.20) 
N 224 224 
R-sq 0.07 0.11 
Adjusted R-sq 0.05 0.09 
F statistic 4.44*** 5.62*** 
R-sq change 0.04 
F for R-sq change 2.89** 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, yp < 0.1.process. In family ﬁrms the familial informal practices may account
for the retention differential with non family ﬁrms at any given
level of HPWPs adoption. While some informal practices may
impact on retention also through skill-enhancing, motivation-
enhancing, and participation-enhancing effects, the difference
with non-family ﬁrms lies primarily in the reciprocation effects.
This depends on the strategic horizon adopted by family ﬁrms
as a consequence of the goal of maximising the familial socio-
emotional wealth and in the associated, close, trust-based and
long-term relationships established with the employees. In light of
social exchange theory, these type of investments by the employ-
ers may induce reciprocation behaviours in the employees. Indeed,
the results show that as the intensity of HPWPs adoption increases,
the difference in the extent of retention becomes lower. In family
ﬁrms the effects arising from the reciprocation need are already
satisﬁed by the informal dimensions of the social exchange and the
employees in family ﬁrms will be less sensitive to an increase in
HPWPs intensity compared to non-family ﬁrms’ employees, who in
turn are more likely to value formal mechanisms of involvement,
as the informal ones are absent or less relevant. This observation
corroborates the theoretical proposition advanced by Pearson and
Marler (2010), according to which family ﬁrms are more likely to
establish a stronger reciprocal stewardship culture compared to
non-family ﬁrms.
A possible complementary explanation of our ﬁndings, in line
with the theory of person-organization ﬁt (Memili & Barnett,
2008; O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991), could be that family
ﬁrms attract people who have a motivational proﬁle which is
consistent with the culture and the value system of the family
business organizational setting.
Regarding the differences among different types of family ﬁrms
(Hypotheses 3–6), our arguments ﬁnd only partial support. No
signiﬁcant “family CEO” effect has been observed in addition with
HPWPs, and only marginal support is provided to the idea of a
moderating effect of family CEO status on the impact of HPWPs.
This suggests that the consequences of family businesses’ informal
HR practices on retention depend on family involvement,
regardless of the family status of the organization’s leader. This
could be explained in light of the small to medium size of our
companies. In such contexts, the proximity of the controllingte.
es (3) Direct Effect Family vs. Non-family Firms (4) Two-way interaction
1.25***
(0.44)
1.20***
(0.05)
1.94***
(0.51)
1.99***
(0.52)
1.71y
(0.94)
1.87*
(0.94)
0.32
(0.94)
0.06
(0.10)
1.39***
(0.52)
2.12***
(0.69)
0.51*
(0.35)
0.50y
(0.38)
1.54*
(0.81)
9.93*** 10.09***
(2.23) (2.22)
224 224
0.13 0.18
0.12 0.16
4.72*** 4.49***
0.03** 0.07***
1.21 3.63**
Table 6
Effects of the different practices on the retention of valuable employees in family
and non-family ﬁrms.
(1) Family Firms (2) Non-family Firms
Previous Performance 0.17**
(0.06)
0.26***
(0.08)
Size 0.10
(0.08)
0.14y
(0.08)
High technology industry 0.06
(0.14)
0.06
(0.16)
Company Nationality 0.02
(0.17)
0.01
(0.17)
Selective stafﬁng 0.07
(0.11)
0.38***
(0.13)
Intensive training 0.04
(0.14)
0.19y
(0.14)
Career development 0.29**
(0.13)
0.14y
(0.12)
Extensive compensation 0.07
(0.11)
0.10**
(0.07)
Performance appraisals 0.11**
(0.06)
0.13**
(0.07)
Employee participation 0.02 0.13***
(0.12) (0.04)
Constant 2.35*** 1.91***
(0.59) (0.59)
N 121 111
R-sq 0.23 0.25
Adjusted R-sq 0.17 0.17
F statistic 3.41*** 3.34***
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, yp < 0.1.
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occupied by family members.
The effect of the founding generation is positive as expected,
but its magnitude is rather small, with a borderline signiﬁcance
level. This could be explained by the presence of family reputation
concerns both in the ﬁrst generation and in later generations. In
ﬁrst generation the “sense of dynasty” and the willingness to
establish a family legacy might prevail, whereas family image and
prestige of the family name become increasingly important in the
later generations (e.g. Zellweger et al., 2013). Both these forces are
positively related with the establishment of cohesive employee
communities.
Overall our results add also to the human resource management
literature, and in particular to the social exchange perspective in
the study of HRM practices (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Jiang,
et al., 2012), by suggesting that informal practices might have an
important role in the social exchange between employers and
employees and by showing how the ownership and leadership
context may promote feelings of reciprocation that combine with
the individual effects of formal practices on the employees to elicit
positive organizational outcomes.
Moreover, as the existing literature on HPWPs has identiﬁed a
prevalence of additive effects among sets of practices (Chuang
et al., 2012; Delery, 1998; Jiang et al., 2012) even though earlier
theoretical contributions had admitted the possibility of different
types of relationships (for example synergistic or substitution) no
study has considered that informal practices may combine with
the formal ones to produce positive organizational outcomes. The
analysis of the combination between the family effect fostering the
establishment of informal practices and HPWPs thus allows us to
extend the knowledge of the ways HRM practices interact.
Whereas Delery (1998) and others (e.g. Macky & Boxall, 2007)
suggest that HRM practices interact either in an additive,
synergistic or substitutive effect, with one alternative excluding
the other, our results show that the interaction between HRM
practices (in our case, formal and informal ones) could lead to both
additive and substitutive effects. This combination of additive andinteractive effects may generate super-additive or, as in our case,
sub-additive effects.
Our study has also signiﬁcant managerial implications. Family
ﬁrms are often criticised for not investing enough in HPWPs; our
results, while not denying the need to establish management
practices aimed at increasing procedural justice and reducing the
perceptions of nepotism (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006) suggest
that HPWPs investments beyond a certain level would actually be
superﬂuous, given that the informal mechanisms originating from
the family inﬂuence may act as substitutes of various formal
techniques.
8. Conclusions, limitations and future developments
In this study we examined to what extent High Performance
Work Practices (HPWPs) contribute to the retention of valuable
employees in family versus non-family ﬁrms and in different
situations of family inﬂuence.
Overall the results indicate that: (a) the family ﬁrm status and
the conditions strengthening the family inﬂuence on the ﬁrm have
a positive impact on retention; (b) in the presence of HPWPs, the
“family effect” combines with the formal practices to produce a
positive inﬂuence on retention; and (c) some of the outcomes of
the family inﬂuence and of the adoption of formal practices may be
so similar that they produce substitution effects on retention.
With this research we add to the knowledge on human resource
practices in family ﬁrms, a topic that is still in its infancy in the
family business studies (Cruz et al., 2011), and in particular, as
explained above, we shed new light on the contrasting arguments
regarding HRM practices targeted at non-family employees. We
also contribute to the social exchange perspective in the study of
family ﬁrms and to the HRM literature concerning the ways HRM
practices interact. Our study may suggest several issues for future
research. First of all, we measured the intensity of use of HPWPs,
but we make only conjectures about the use of informal and
relational practices, assuming that a lower adoption of HPWPs
corresponds to an higher reliance on social mechanisms. Future
research should directly identify the informal dimensions of
human resource management practices that leverage on family
social capital.
A major limitation in our dataset is that we do not have accurate
measures of different degrees of family involvement in the
management (except for the CEO family status), and this is
probably one of the main reasons why we did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant
differences within the family ﬁrms subsample. Therefore, future
studies should focus on more ﬁne-grained differentiation within
family ﬁrms according to various dimensions of family involve-
ment. This could stimulate further contributions also to the general
HRM literature, for example by exploring how different cognitive
orientations of family versus non-family business managers
impact on the adoption of HRM practices and on the employee-
level outcomes.
Although statistical tests suggest that common method bias
should not be a problem, the use of more objective measures and/
or multiple respondents would improve the quality of empirical
results. In particular, it would be interesting to measure directly
the perceptions of the employees in connection as a mediator
between HPWPs and turnover intentions.
Moreover, qualitative techniques could be more appropriate to
investigate in-depth the phenomena under scrutiny, since they
involve relational processes among family members and employ-
ees. For example, a qualitative analysis of conﬁgurations of
practices could lead to the identiﬁcation of trade-off effects
between single informal and formal practices, shedding more light
on the combinatorial dynamics of HR practices and offering
86 D. Pittino et al. / Journal of Family Business Strategy 7 (2016) 75–89suggestions to family ﬁrms about the most effective formal
practices to be implemented.
Appendix A.
Items for measuring high-performance work practices
(HPWPs).
Construct and
resulting
Cronbach’s alpha
level
Original items from previous
literature
Adapted items
Selective stafﬁng
(a = 0.822)
‘We have gone to great
lengths to establish the best
stafﬁng procedures possible’
(Patel & Conklin, 2012: 227).
SS1: “The selection of new
staff follows a structured
process.”
‘Predictors with high
predictive validity are used
(work sample tests,
assessment centre,
biographical questionnaire)’
(Sels et al., 2006: 330)
‘Applicants undergo
structured interviews [ . . . ]
before being hired.’ (Wright
et al., 2005: 425)
SS2: “Techniques, such as
structured interviews, work
sample tests, or assessment
centres, are used to assist in
the selection process.”
‘[ . . . ] the hiring criteria
used to select employees in
three categories [ . . . ]’
(MacDufﬁe, 1995: 207)
SS4: “Hiring criteria are used
to select new employees.”
‘The recruitment and
selection activities of the
company are systematically
evaluated’ (Sels et al., 2006:
330)
SS5: “Recruitment and
selection activities of the
company are systematically
evaluated.”
Intensive
training
(a = 0.836)
‘Is training a high priority?’
(Patel & Conklin, 2012: 227)
IT1: “Training is a high
priority.”
‘[ . . . ] the level of training
provided to newly hired
production workers,
supervisors, and engineers in
the ﬁrst six months of
employment [ . . . ]’
(MacDufﬁe, 1995: 208)
IT2: “Training is provided to
newly hired staff.”
‘Are different kinds of
training available?’ (Patel &
Conklin, 2012: 227)
IT3: “The company offers
different kinds of formal
training to existing staff.”
‘The company has a strategic
training plan’ (Sels et al.,
2006: 330)
IT4: “The company has a
strategic training plan.”
‘Extent to which reactions,
learning, behavioural and
performance effects after
company training are
measured.’ (Sels et al., 2006:
330)
IT5: “Reactions, learning,
behavioural and
performance effects after
company training are
measured.”
Career
development
(a = 0.776)
‘The company offers
operational staff the
possibility of attaining a
higher hierarchical level’
(Sels et al., 2006: 330)
CD1: “The company offers
non-management staff the
possibility of attaining a
higher hierarchical level.”
‘The company offers
operational staff the
possibility of becoming
active in other functional
domains at the same level’
(Sels et al., 2006: 330)
CD2: “The company offers
non-management staff the
possibility of becoming
active in other functional
domains at the same level.”
‘Appraisal system related to
succession planning,
concerned with what an
individual will be capable of
doing in the future’ (Sels
et al., 2006: 330)
CD3: “The appraisal system
is related to succession
planning and concerned
with what an individual will
be capable of doing in the
future.”
‘Employees have clear career
paths in this organization’
(Patel & Conklin, 2012: 227)
CD4: “In the organization
different career models are
available to employees.”
Extensive
compensation
‘The level of employees’ total
compensation’ (Kerr et al.,
2007: 60), ranging from
EC1: “Employees receive a
high level of total(Continued)
Construct and
resulting
Cronbach’s alpha
level
Original items from previous
literature
Adapted items
and beneﬁts
(a = 0.698)
below, around, to above
industry standard
compensation (compared to
the industry average).”
‘Part of the wage of blue and/
or white-collar workers
depends on individual
performances or merit’ (Sels
et al., 2006: 330)
EC2: “Salaries and wages
partly depend on individual
performance or merit.”
‘Number of extra beneﬁts
which the company offers its
employees’ (Sels et al., 2006:
330)
EC3: “The company offers
funded extra beneﬁts to its
employees (e.g. childcare
facilities, company cars).”
‘Proﬁt sharing (or some
other type of company based
reward system)’ (Patel &
Conklin, 2012: 227)
EC4: “The organization has
some form of company-
based reward system (e.g.
proﬁt-sharing).”
Performance
appraisals
(a = 0.835)
‘What proportion of the
workforce receives formal
performance appraisals?’
(Huselid, 1995: 646)
‘Employees in this job
regularly (at least once a
year) receive a formal
evaluation of their
performance.’ (Wright et al.,
2005: 425)
PA1: “The company regularly
conducts formal
performance appraisals with
its employees.”
‘Use of a system which
speciﬁes procedure and
criteria for the appraisal
process’ (Sels et al., 2006:
330)
PA2: “Performance
appraisals follow a speciﬁc
procedure, and criteria for
the appraisal process are
available.”
‘Appraisal procedure that
relates to the allocation an
attribution of awards,
rewards and beneﬁts’ (Sels
et al., 2006: 330)
PA3: “Appraisals are related
to the allocation of awards,
rewards, and beneﬁts.”
‘Appraisal procedure aimed
at the development and
motivation of staff by
looking at how well he or she
is doing’ (Sels et al., 2006:
330)
PA3: “Appraisals are aimed
at giving feedback on the
development of employees.”
‘Employee appraisals
emphasize long term and
group-based achievement.’
(Patel & Conklin, 2012: 227)
PA5: “Employee appraisals
emphasise an employee’s
past performance as well as
their future potential.”
Employee
participation
(a = 0.786)
‘[ . . . ] degree of inﬂuence
over tasks, tools, work
methods, pace of work,
schedules, vacations, and
technology design [ . . . ]’
(Batt, 2002: 591)
EP1: “Employees are free in
organising their work (e.g.
tasks, tools, speed of work,
work schedules, holiday).”
‘Employee representation at
board/senior management
meetings’ (Patel & Conklin,
2012: 228)
EP2: “Employees are
represented at board/general
management meetings.”
‘Degree to which non-
supervisory employees
participate in “management”
decisions regarding
investment, work ﬂow,
product development, and
productivity monitoring.’
(Arthur, 1994: 495)
EP3: “Employees can
inﬂuence management
decisions on investments,
work ﬂows, product
development, and
productivity monitoring.”
‘Extent to which, e.g. via
consultation, consideration
is given to employees’
opinions’ (Sels et al., 2006:
330)
EP4: “Consideration, e.g. via
consultation or suggestion
systems, is given to
employees’ opinions.”
‘What is the proportion of
the workforce who are
included in a formal
information sharing
program (e.g., a
EP5: “The company regularly
shares information on
strategy, performance
outcomes or the
employment evolution with
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Construct and
resulting
Cronbach’s alpha
level
Original items from previous
literature
Adapted items
newsletter)?’ (Huselid, 1995:
646)
non-management
employees.”
‘Percentage of employees
involved in training for
group problem solving,
quality circles, and labor-
management committees.’
(Arthur, 1994: 495)
EP6: “Employees take part in
formal work teams, such as
problem-solving groups,
quality circles, or labour
management committees.”
‘Employees in this job have a
reasonable and fair
complaint process.’ (Wright
et al., 2005: 425)
EP7: “Employees have access
to a fair complaint process.”
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